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COMMERCE CLAUSE
U.S. CONST. art. , § 8, cl. 3:
The Congress shall have the power ... to regulate Commerce
... among the several states ....
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION
FIRST DEPARTMENT
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company
V.
City of New York Department of Finance'
(decided December 9, 1997)
The New York City Department of Finance issued a notice of
determination after discovering a tax deficiency upon the audit of
plaintiff's, R.J. Reynolds Tobacco's, tax returns. 2  The tax
deficiency concerned the extent of plaintiff's deduction for
plaintiff's out-of -state property.3 New York City's Department
of Finance found that plaintiffs deductions violated New York
City's General Corporation Tax.4 Specifically, plaintiffs 1987
and 1988 tax returns took the accelerated depreciation deduction
permitted under the Internal Revenue Code' and failed to
1 667 N.Y.S.2d 4 (1st Dep't 1997).
2Id. at 7.
3id.
4 Id. at 6-7. The Corporation Tax is embodied in Title XI of the
Administrative Code. The Code provides in pertinent part: "[E]very domestic
or foreign corporation that does business, employs capital, or owns or leases
property in the city in a corporate or organized capacity shall annually pay a
tax, upon the basis of its entire net income." N.Y. ADMIT. CODE § 11-603.
Under another Code provision, the corporate taxpayer cannot take an
accelerated depreciation deduction if the depreciated property had been was
"placed in service in New York" after 1984. N.Y. ADMIN. CODE § 11-602.
1 I.R.C. § 168. This section law governs the accelerated depreciation
deduction in New York. Id.
1
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distinguish between its property placed in service within and out
of the state.6
Plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of the relative
provisions of the Administrative Code and the Supreme Court,
New York County, granted summary judgment to plaintiff.' The
provisions were declared unconstitutional by the court and the
statute was found to be in violation of the Commerce Clause of
the United States Constitution.8  Consequently, the notice of
determination was declared void and the City was permanently
enjoined from exacting compliance with the notice in addition to
the "subject Code provisions." 9
The Department of Finance appealed the decision of the
Supreme Court, New York County,' 0 and the Appellate Division,
First Department, affirmed the lower court's decision to grant
plaintiff's motion for summary judgment." The Appellate
Division found that the City "failed to articulate what
constitutionally legitimate local purpose is being served" and that
the "[o]rdinance in question had the practical effect of
discriminating against taxpayers doing business in New York who
have commercial property located outside of New York.""2
Plaintiff, R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company, a New Jersey
corporation, 3 with its principal place of business located in
North Carolina, is involved in the manufacture and sale of
cigarettes in interstate commerce. 4 During the years 1987 and
1988, plaintiffs manufacturing facilities were located mostly in
Winston Salem, North Carolina, but it distributed and marketed
6 Reynolds, 667 N.Y.S.2d at 7.
7 id.
8 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The Commerce Clause provides that:
"[The Congress shall have the Power... to regulate Commerce.. .among the
several states." Id.
' Reynolds, 667 N.Y.S.2d at 7.
1 Id.
" Id. at 11.
' Id. at 8.
3 Id. at 5.
14 Id.
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tobacco products throughout New York.'5 This New York
activity is subject to New York City's taxing law. 6
New York City generally permitted plaintiffs use of federal
deductions on the corporation's federal tax return.' 7 However,
the City did not permit plaintiff's accelerated depreciation
deduction for property not located in New York state.'8 This is
significant because accelerated depreciation allows for "the
relative greater deductibility during the early years, which
releases funds that otherwise would be embarked for taxes." 19
Defendants argued on appeal that the statute at issue does not
violate the Commerce Clause, because it does not impose a
burden on interstate commerce and even if a burden did exist, the
statute is not discriminatoryY The Appellate Division, however,
found the tax to be facially discriminatory in burdening out-of-
state business over local business, 2' resulting in a benefit to local
business.? To pass constitutional muster, "the state tax must be
applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing
state; it must be fairly apportioned; it must not discriminate
against interstate commerce, and it must be fairly related to the
services provided by the state. . . ."2 After finding the statute to
be "facially discriminatory," the burden shifted to the City to
show the existence of a "legitimate local benefit" that could not
be achieved by less discriminatory means.2 The City failed to
meet this burden and consequently the Appellate Division found
that no legitimate purpose existed and the tax was
unconstitutional.2-
Is Id.
161,d.
171d. at7.
181d.
19 d. at6.
20Id. at 7.211d. at 11.
2 Id.
23 Id. at 8.
24 1d. at 9.
1 Id. The court held that the taxing ordinance imposed unequal treatment on
taxpayers "results solely from the situs of their activities and provides a
commercial advantage on local businesses." Id.
1998 875
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In Associated Industries v. Lohman,26 the United States
Supreme Court explained that the Commerce Clause "embodies a
negative command forbidding the States to discriminate against
interstate trade. ' 27  The Court specifically adhered to the
significance in protecting the country from "economic
protectionist" measures, such as additional taxes, which burden
out-of-state businesses for the benefit of in-staters. 28 The tax at
issue involved an additional use tax that exempted sales of goods
that took place within the state. 29 When using the test outlined
above, the Court found the scheme to be "impermissibly
discriminatory" in certain localities. 0
In interpreting the protection afforded by the Commerce
Clause, the Reynolds court cited to American Telephone &
Telegraph company v. New York Department of Taxation &
Finance3 in which a similar tax apportionment to the case at bar
was "not practically necessary as well as being constitutionally
offensive."32  The New York Court of Appeals stressed the
importance of preserving "the economic unit" of the nation.33
Hence, in following the same test as the previous two cases cited,
the Court of Appeals concluded that the discriminatory tax
26 511 U.S. 641 (1994).
27 Id. at 646.
2' Id. at 647.
29 Id. The State of Missouri created an "additional use tax of 1.5% on the
privilege of storing, using, or consuming within the State any article of
personal property purchased outside the State." Id. at 644 (citing Mo. REV.
STAT. § 144.748 (1993)). Petitioner, Aminox Foils, Inc., a manufacturing
firm in Missouri, claimed the tax law was impermissibly discriminatory
"against interstate commerce." Id. at 645. In considering the validity of the
tax, the United States Supreme Court asserted that the Commerce Clause
"embodies a negative command forbidding the States to discriminate against
interstate trade." Id. at 646. Therefore, the Court held that the tax was
unconstitutional in its discrimination against interstate trade. Id. at 647.
30 Id. at 656.
31 84 N.Y.2d 31, 637 N.E.2d 257, 614 N.Y.S.2d 366 (1994).
32 Id. at 35, 637 N.E.2d at 259, 614 N.Y.S.2d at 368. AT&T challenged a
New York tax law that required long distance carriers "to deduct its carrier
access expense from its interstate and international receipts prior to
apportionment." Id. at 34, 637 N.E.2d at 258, 614 N.Y.S.2d at 367.
" Id. at 34, 637 N.E.2d at 259, 614 N.Y.S.2d at 368.
876 [Vol 14
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treatment towards long-distance telephone carriers engaged in
interstate commerce was serving a legitimate benefit that could
not be served by other methods."
In deciding the issue of whether a corporate tax statute of the
New York City Administrative Code, that forbade corporations
doing business in the state to take certain deductions on out-of-
state property, while permitting the deductions for in-state
property, is an unconstitutional violation of the Commerce
Clause, 5 the Reynolds court found the tax discriminatory and
unconstitutional. This is a broad interpretation of the
Commerce Clause.
As demonstrated by the First Department, the Commerce
Clause grants Congress a plenary power over interstate
commerce. However, federal and state courts have allowed states
to tax interstate commerce when the tax bears a substantial nexus
to the taxing state, and where such tax is fairly related to the
benefits the taxing state provides.37 If the state cannot overcome
the presumption of facial discrimination with a showing of a
legitimate local benefit that could not be achieved without some
measure of discrimination, the tax will be deemed
unconstitutional.3
34Id. at 35, 637 N.E.2d at 259, 614 N.Y.S.2d at 368.
11 R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. City of New York, 667 N.Y.S.2d 4, 9 (Ist
Dep't 1997).
36 Id. at 32.
1 See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
31 See supra notes 24 and 25 and accompanying text.
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